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Abstract—This paper presents a measure of resilience which 
can guide system design and management. Systems design must 
incorporate resilience to provide stakeholders with the most 
appropriate solution for their life-cycle needs. Design of resilient 
systems demands a measure of the resilience afforded by a system 
proposal which can be used to compare design proposals. The 
measurement method should balance the interest in resilience 
with all other proposal evaluation criteria, and incorporate the 
effect of the sequence of unknown future events affecting the 
system. Ideally, the resilience measure should also be useful to 
guide management decisions re maintenance or upgrade during 
the system life. This paper presents a method to measure system 
resilience which can be applied to engineered systems in general, 
not just a specific class of systems, is threat type agnostic, and 
does not presuppose any ‘desirable’ outcome allowing a system 
specific determination of ‘desirable’ outcomes. 
 
Index Terms—Measurement, system analysis and design, 
system-level design, system metric, systems system resilience 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ESILIENCE is often discussed in systems engineering but 
there various interpretations of what it is and this presents 
a challenge for defining a measure of resilience. In this paper 
we discuss the concept of resilience in a way that enables a 
measure of resilience which could be used to compare realized 
systems, but more importantly, could be used to compare 
system proposals. Comparison of proposals is necessary to 
make the measure useful in system design, through answering 
questions such as: “is this proposal more resilient than that?” 
The properties of the measure of resilience presented are: 
1. Generalizable to any engineered system. 
2. Agnostic of threat type. 
3. Agnostic of outcome, both short and long-term, 
following a threat encounter. 
4. Cognizant that performance is multidimensional. 
5. Cognizant that threat events occur at any time during the 
lifecycle, with statistically predictable frequency. 
The first property enables use of the measure in system 
development. For instance, particular systems may require a 
threshold level of predicted resilience. Generalizability also 
enables comparison of proposals which may respond 
 
Manuscript received XXX/XXX/XXXX. 
T.L.J. Ferris is with the Centre for Systems Engineering, Cranfield 
University, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom Shrivenham, SN6 8LA, 
UK (e-mail: timothy.ferris@cranfield.ac.uk). 
differently to each potential threat type. 
The second property recognizes that any system operates in 
an environment with diverse potential threats. Developing 
protection against one type may make the system more 
vulnerable to another. Stakeholders who depend on the system 
are primarily interested in the quality and continuity of service 
provided rather than the cause of failures. 
The third property enables generalization. An acceptable, or 
desirable, outcome depends on the kind of system. For 
engineered systems the range of acceptable outcomes is 
diverse; from virtually no performance glitch, to destruction, 
and linked to the nature and magnitude of the threat. 
The fourth property recognizes that the performance of 
most systems is multidimensional, and that a single figure 
measure of performance is rarely meaningful. 
The fifth property is important because the probability of 
threat encounters, of various kinds, is predictable but the time 
of each encounter, including events affecting the system 
before recovery or restoration from earlier events, cannot be 
predicted. 
A measure with these properties will accommodate the 
breadth of concepts of resilience described by Woods [1], 
namely resilience as rebound, robustness, graceful 
extensibility, and sustained adaptability. 
II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
A. Definition of Measurement 
The theory of measurement from Helmholtz [2], through 
Campbell [3], Bridgman [4] and Stevens [5] to the 
representational theory of measurement formulated by 
psychologists [6], and brought into engineering by Finkelstein 
[7], when extended to provide a relationship of the observed 
manifestation and the conclusions formed about the observed 
through the measurement, leads to the definition: 
“Measurement is an empirical process, using an instrument, 
effecting a rigorous and objective mapping of an observable 
into a category in a model of the observable that meaningfully 
distinguishes the manifestation from other possible and 
distinguishable manifestations” [8]. 
This definition depends on the existence of a model of the 
observed manifestation. The model depends on a definition of 
the kind of manifestation observed, so, there must be a 
fundamental link of the measure and definition of resilience. 
B. Definition of “Resilience” for Engineering 
Resilience scholarship has addressed several system kinds, 
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beginning with Holling’s work in ecology [9][10] which 
focused on restoration of equilibrium after perturbation. 
Engineering resilience has variously combined time, before, 
during and after, threat encounters, and outcome kind, such as 
unimpeded operation or recovery time. 
To formulate a model of resilience we must define 
“resilience” but “it is difficult to identify a single definition 
that – word for word – satisfies all. However, it is possible to 
gain general agreement of what is meant by resilience of 
engineered systems; viz., resilience is the ability to provide 
required capability in the face of adversity” [11]. Resilience 
has multiple aspects associated with time before, during and 
after threat events. The appropriate response depends on both 
the system and threat specifics. 
The state view of system resilience, Fig. 1, which shows 
resilience as a system property associated with before, during 
and after threat encounter phases, including damage and 
performance degradation, was developed to address these 
difficulties. After degradation the system may be used as it is, 
fully or partially restored, or decommissioned. Nuss et al [12] 
used an earlier version of Fig 1 to frame their definition of 
resilience. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Simplified system state model of resilience. State transitions that result 
in the same state before and after the transition omitted. 
 
The state machine view emphasizes that threats may cause 
system breakage or failure as an engineering fact. Thus, the 
engineer must determine, and specify, what degradation and 
restorative possibilities are appropriate in the face of threats. 
What is appropriate depends on system specifics, so we cannot 
impose any particular outcome on all systems. 
Consequently no measure of resilience that imposes a 
simple measure, such as time to complete restoration, or time 
to recover to greater than  functionality, is appropriate. The 
notion of  of functionality is problematic because system 
function is multidimensional [2]. 
The states in Fig. 1 are summary states which could be 
expanded to show detail of which system parts are present, 
functioning or otherwise. Degradation could be modelled by 
assessing the effect of part failures, singly or in combination. 
This work could, and should, be done for specific proposals, 
but cannot be done in general, as applicable to all systems. 
III. REVIEW OF MEASUREMENT OF RESILIENCE 
We discuss previously published methods to measure 
resilience. 
A. Unidimensional Measures of Performance or Capability 
Ideally a resilience measure is a single value that represents 
the achieved system resilience. It would be expected to, at 
least, describe resilience on an ordinal scale. Preferably, the 
scale would be of ratio form, enabling direct comparison of 
amounts of resilience achieved by design proposals [5]. If the 
measure of resilience is linked to a single measure of 
performance, then the multiple dimensions of performance 
must be aggregated to a single measure. 
Rehman, Ryan and Efatmaneshnik [13] propose a system 
capability measure which follows a saw tooth shape through 
time in response to capability upgrade events. This does not 
address the multi-dimensionality of the manifestations which 
lead to capability. Bukowski [14] describes ‘performance’ 
using a time function graph of performance. A threat that 
disrupts causes a rapid, significant, performance diminution 
followed by recovery, with gradual return to full performance. 
Francis and Bekera [15] present a similar unidimensional 
measure predicated on “the ultimate goal of resilience is the 
continuity of normal system function”. Continuity of normal 
function may be appropriate for some systems facing certain 
threat, but this goal should not be uncritically generalized. 
Erol, Henry and Sauser [16] present a measure based on a 
two dimensional disruption probability and consequence 
severity map of vulnerability to threat types. Erol, Henry, 
Sauser and Mansouri [17] apply this resilience measurement 
model in an enterprise scenario discussing several cases post 
hoc without addressing the design phase. They use a single 
performance variable, achieved to a proportion of design level 
following Henry and Ramirez-Marquez [18][19]. The same 
authors [20] applied the concept to power supply recovery 
after Hurricane Sandy using supply restoration as the singular 
goal, which is prima facie reasonable for a power supply 
network but is inappropriate for a system where partial 
performance is meaningful. Their measure is inappropriate if 
the consumers’ premises cannot use supply. Sterbenz et al 
[21] present a similar model to measure remediation strategy 
effectiveness. 
Han, Marais and DeLaurentis [22] plot the percentage of 
‘full’ performance against the percentage of the system which 
has failed. This approach continues the proportion of 
performance problem and adds the concept of ‘proportion’ of 
the system failure. Uday and Marais [23] recognizes the 
context specificity of the resilience factors. Disruption and 
recovery capacity are distinct and what is desirable is system 
specific, and must be incorporated into a resilience measure. 
Uday and Marais [24] presented a function of performance 
level against time, similar to other equivalent resilience 
measures. Ayyub [25] presents a similar resilience measure, 
except that the final measure is the time integral of 
performance as a proportion of design level. 
Raj et al [26] recognized recovery, rather than failure cause 
as central to resilience, and provided a resilience measure 
  
relying solely on recovery time. Nan and Sansavini [27] 
consider a power transmission network providing a resilience 
measure in the single dimension of actual supply as a 
proportion of design capacity. This measure assumes the value 
of achieved performance scales linearly with the quantity. 
Tran et al [28] present a measure using a time integral of 
performance through events but assume a linear relationship 
of achieved performance and value. Their method differs from 
this paper in this and also in using a singular measure of 
performance. 
Hosseini et al [29] reviewed definitions and measures of 
resilience in 2016 finding that there is much diversity and no 
resolution on both definition and measurement. 
The constructs of these measures of resilience do not 
address the issues 3 and 4 and only weakly address the issues 
1 and 5 listed in the introduction of this paper as the desirable 
goals of a measure of resilience. 
B. Multidimensional Measures of Response 
A societal response to an earthquake is multidimensional 
and multi-timescale. The approach of [30] is to provide a 
scorecard where each contributor to resilience is identified but 
there is no consolidated resilience score. This approach is 
necessarily post hoc. In similar work Van der Beek and 
Schraagen [31] developed a nine-dimensional scale for the 
resilience of work teams but provided no unified resilience 
measure. We note, observation of factors associated with 
resilience is not measurement of resilience. A similar approach 
is found in Schneider et al [32] which presents a community 
resilience measure in the face of relevant threats. They 
identify resilience inputs rather than their effect. These 
approaches indicate resilience maturity but do not measure 
resilience. 
Tokgoz and Gheorghe [33] present a resilience measure to 
assess the multidimensional impact of hurricane wind on 
buildings based on analysis of building wind response. 
However, they only consider wind threats and not the 
challenge of multiple threat types. 
Wheaton and Madni [34] consider the cost of providing 
resilience and the potential conflict between solutions offered 
for different aspects. This is resolved by a trade-off analysis of 
cost and benefit of possible action. Ross, Rhodes and 
Fitzgerald [35] present a value model to do the trade analysis 
starting with a multi-attribute utility calculation using the 
analytic hierarchy process to combine dimensions. Their 
approach assists system design and uses a well-understood 
design trade-off approach. Their approach is limited by its 
view of resilience as a static problem. 
The multidimensional measures of resilience do not address 
points 3 and 5, and to only weakly address item 1 in the 
checklist of desired characteristics of a measure of resilience 
in section I of this paper. The gaps in the desired 
characteristics of a measure of resilience show that the 
objective of the measure of resilience presented in this paper is 
novel. The major gaps between the prior work and the present 
measure are: 
1. The present measure addresses the multidimensionality 
problem by using the agreed value for scale tradeoff 
analysis for the system generated for the choice 
between system alternatives. 
2. The present measure uses the statistical distributions of 
threat events using a Monte Carlo approach to 
modelling a large plurality of system lifecycles to 
measure resilience to determine the preferred 
alternative. 
IV. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATIONS 
We consider resilience measures like that presented here. 
A. Brtis Probability Based Metric 
Brtis [36] presents a probability based metric in the first 
published general purpose measure, as reproduced below. 
 
 (1) 
where, 
 is the resilience of the required capability  
 is the number of exhaustive and mutually exclusive 
adversity scenarios within a context (  can equal 1) 
 is the probability of adversity scenario   
 is timewise availability of the required capability 
during scenario . (0 is below the required level, 1 is at or 
above the required level. Where circumstances dictate 
this may take on a more complex, non-binary function of 
time.) 
 is length of the mission window 
A context can be threat-based or scenario-based. 
 
This metric is based on availability of the threshold value of 
the “capability”, as expressed by the centrality of the term 
. This assumes a system only has value if it achieves a 
performance threshold. If the threshold is closer than 
necessary to “full” performance in every dimension to achieve 
a meaningful contribution the metric, , may be excessively 
harsh on the proposed system configuration. If the threshold is 
too low, the metric will insufficiently reflect lost performance. 
Brtis use of an availability focused, rather than a value-
focused measure, is based on concern about the difficulty of a 
value focused measure to encourage design to improve 
average performance without focusing on serviceability 
threshold criteria. 
Brtis’ metric addresses system capacity to complete a single 
mission and loses generality because it is tailored for systems 
used in the episodic manner of ‘missions’. 
B. Small et al – A Value Focused Thinking Approach 
Small et al [37] present an approach with two key 
categories: Mission Resilience and Platform Resilience. 
Mission Resilience concerns the mission time-scale, that is 
episodes of system use with a defined beginning and end. 
Platform resilience concerns the system life-cycle. Many 
systems assets are acquired with the intention of significantly 
long life, during which other stakeholders’ actions change 
  
either other assets which interact with the particular system or 
the scenarios impacting the system. The concept of Platform 
Resilience was developed in the context of defence systems 
which have long anticipated life likely to involve the 
challenges of: interoperability with legacy systems and future 
systems; component obsolescence; use for unanticipated 
purposes; and facing novel threats. The acquisition timeline is 
long, so, even in the absence of other constraints, new assets 
could not be acquired to respond to the challenges. Other 
factors, such as cost, result in continued use of assets even 
when severely impacted by the new challenges. 
Small et al used value focused thinking (VFT) in a way that 
overcomes Brtis’ criticism. The value of the system is 
described using the system proposal trade-off process, as 
normally used in the development of a system to determine 
which configuration provides the most suitable solution. The 
trade-off analysis normally involves combining an 
‘importance’ weighting and a value for scale function for each 
of the multiple attributes. Both the weighting and value for 
scale functions are agreed before comparing any design 
proposals. VFT uses the trade-off analysis to compare the 
value provided by the proposals. If the focus is on alternatives 
the trade-off is performed with functions that describe the 
value for scale of achievable measures of the parameters 
whilst in VFT the range of measures extends to an ideal 
quantity, and its associated value. 
Duirng design ne must choose one of the alternatives 
offered. In VFT the comparison is made to pre-agreed ideal 
measures of performance, whilst in threshold based thinking 
the comparison is with the agreed sufficient value. The effect 
of this difference is that in VFT the preferred alternative is 
chosen based on the ideal; any quantity greater than the 
threshold requirement manifests as either, or both, mission or 
platform resilience, depending on when its effect is gained. 
C. Nuss et al – Resilience as a Tradable Parameter 
Nuss et al [12] present a development of an approach to 
resilience as a tradable parameter in which ‘system utility’ is 
calculated through threat events. The method of calculating 
utility is not developed explicitly, and its value is an aggregate 
level as a function of time focusing on the mission timescale. 
This approach addresses goals 1, 2 and 4 of the present 
measure of resilience. However, there is a fundamental 
difference because of Nuss et al’s focus on recovery, which is 
nly applicable for some systems, goal 3, and focus on the 
mission timescale, which is inherently individual sample 
focused, rather than the lifecycle focus of goal 5, which is, in 
turn, of greater relevance to decisions about fleets of a system. 
V. PROPOSED MEASURE OF RESILIENCE - PREAMBLE 
A. Foundational Perspective 
The new approach to measuring resilience of an engineered 
system lies in recognizing the purpose of engineering of 
systems. Engineered systems are made to provide a service to 
one or more stakeholders whose primary interest in the system 
is the service it provides rather than the system itself. A 
stakeholder who approaches the system as means to an end 
has relatively little interest in how that service is provided. 
This observation manifests in the current market for purchase 
of services rather than assets, but even where the engineered 
system is acquired, the means to an end it provides is the 
acquirer’s primary interest, not the object itself. 
For example, a bus commuter is interested in whether a bus, 
of roughly the specification they expect arrives and takes them 
on their planned journey within reasonable schedule, comfort 
and safety expectations and for the advertised fare. That 
commuter is not concerned about which bus operates the 
service so long as the service provider sends one. The service 
provider sees their bus fleet as means to provide the service, 
and so long as the fleet can provide the service to agreed 
expectations their concern with the number of ‘spare’ buses, 
under repair or ready to deploy in replacement of a failure, is 
to have the number that enable them to provide the service at 
the most profitable level. Technical knowledge of the bus’s 
internal operation is not the interest of either the service 
operator who uses the buses, or the prospective passenger, 
who uses the final service provided. The manufacturer of 
buses is interested in the details of the equipment. Successful 
manufacturers determine the requirements of the bus in 
cognizance of the intended service provision. 
We observe that the beneficiary stakeholders need the 
service under certain conditions, but that the service provided 
may not be useful to them under other conditions. For 
example, residents of a city which is subject to inundation 
need a power network which supplies almost all of them at all 
times, and a reasonable measure of resilience in the face of 
normal times disruptions, such as vehicle collisions with 
network equipment, is potentially meaningfully described by 
duration until all consumers’ supply is restored. When an 
inundation occurs many consumers’ premises cease to be fit to 
receive supply, so supply would be of no benefit. A resilience 
measure related to the proportion of consumers restored to 
supply in a specified duration would not be meaningful. A 
measure of resilience needs to be subtle enough to 
accommodate the specifics of the system to guide design to 
provide appropriate outcomes in the face of disruption. 
B. Trade-space as a Method to Resolve Comparative Value 
The conventional systems design approach to decide 
between multiple design options is to establish a trade-space 
model to find a figure-of-merit (FOM) for each contending 
choice. There are several trade-space methods used, each with 
distinct properties. However, all the methods follow a similar 
outline, as follows: 
1. Identify the set of system attributes or measures which 
are sufficiently important to be included. This choice is 
important because an attribute not included in the set 
will have no influence over the solution chosen, but if 
the number of attributes is too great the impact of each 
on the decision is diluted. 
2. Determine relative importance weights for each attribute 
in the set. 
3. Determine value-for-scale functions for each attribute in 
  
the set. 
4. For each design proposal in the analysis estimate the 
measure of each attribute likely to be achieved under 
normal operational conditions. Determine the value of 
each proposal, usually as the sum of the product of the 
attribute weights and the value-for-scale of the 
achievable quantity of that attribute. 
The trade-space approach enables a substantially objective 
comparison of design proposals with different properties 
across the range of dimensions because the attribute weights 
and values-to-scale are determined by a staged process where 
it is difficult to predict the proposal which would achieve the 
highest FOM. The reader will note that the trade-space 
approach is not described as objective. This is because the 
choice of which attributes contribute and their weightings and 
the values-to-scale result from the expert opinion obtained 
from subject matter experts and key stakeholders, that is, they 
are derived from elicitation of opinions. 
The fact that the trade-space method for determining which 
system proposal is preferred is the closest to an objective 
method makes it appropriate to consider extension of it to 
measure resilience. We expand this in subsection C below. 
C. Basis of Extension of Trade-space Method for Resilience 
We earlier presented Fig. 1, a state machine model of 
resilience. There are various definitions of resilience in the 
engineering literature, all of which are rhetorically clear about 
the broad content and purpose of engineering resilience but 
deficient to guide engineering work because they do not 
provide an actionable framework. The underlying difficulty is 
that there are too many possible approaches which may be 
useful in certain circumstances. The first version of Fig. 1 was 
presented in [38] and [39] and has been redrawn using the 
conventions of digital bus circuit diagrams to make the 
relationships clearer. Some other changes have also been 
incorporated as the authors of the prior works have refined 
definitions of the states and transitions. 
In interpretation of Fig. 1 it is important to note that the 
eight states are broad-brush states: for example, “State D – 
Partially Functional”, is a broad title that describes many kinds 
of damage which could have been inflicted on the system and 
many different impairments of function, including both total 
loss of certain functions, or diminution in the performance 
level of certain functions. 
It is important to note that Fig. 1 is agnostic concerning the 
nature of the threat. Systems are subject to various threats, 
some of kinds anticipated during the design process and others 
not anticipated, whether or not they should have been. The 
threat itself does nothing to the system performance. What 
affects system performance is the system response, or 
impairment or destruction of some part of the system, 
resulting from the threat encounter, which in turn affects the 
system function by not providing the internal service that that 
part is designed to provide. In turn this leads to impairment or 
diminution of the capacity of the system to deliver the 
intended level of service. 
From the perspective of the user or beneficiary stakeholders 
the system provides impaired or, possibly, non-existent, 
service. Since the beneficiaries are concerned with the system 
as means to deliver a service their judgement of it depends on 
the service they receive in the face of threat related events. 
We now identify two classes of system, from the 
perspective of resilience, which will be relevant in 
development of our resilience measure. The first, and simpler, 
class is systems required to provide a constant set of functions, 
each at the same magnitude, under any conditions. The 
second, more complex class, is where the required functions 
and performance levels are contingent on conditions, internal 
or external, because certain capabilities of the system may 
only be contextually meaningful. For example, a system may 
have a ‘limp home’ mode, requiring a lower level of 
performance of certain core functions than are required for 
normal operation. The ‘limp home’ mode may be activated in 
defined situations. A system must be assigned to one of these 
classes depending on the system specifics. 
VI. MEASURE OF RESILIENCE - DEVELOPMENT 
A. Class 1 Systems – Same Performance at all Times 
We begin by developing the figure of merit, FOM, of 
resilience for systems which are required to have the same 
level of available performance at all times. At any time, , the 
system with  attributes can achieve performance level  
for the th performance attribute in the trade-space analysis, as 
currently used in the design proposal comparison process. The 
value  of the achieved performance level of the th attribute, 
, is determined using a value-for-scale function, , 
which is the value-for-scale function already determined thin 
the project for the purpose of trade-space analysis to determine 
the most desirable alternative: 
 
 (2) 
 
The weights assigned in the trade-space process, already 
performed in the project process, are  for the th attribute. 
Therefore, the instantaneous achieved figure of merit is: 
 
 (3) 
 
So the total figure of merit is: 
 
 (4) 
where 
 is a meaningful duration of use, either mission or 
planned lifecycle duration. (A choice is possible so long 
as all analyses performed in a single comparison have the 
same interval, , because decisions about the desirability 
of system alternatives rely on direct comparability.) 
 
The value of  is a discrete function of time, because the 
system makes step changes of the available performance 
  
depending on event occurrence which may either impair 
system components, resulting in a lower level of available 
performance, or transition to State B, where available 
performance is curtailed by control action in response to 
awareness of a threat, or restoration to an improved, possibly 
full design available performance, through repair or the relief 
of the conditions leading to State B operations. 
The duration  can be divided into  intervals such that a 
monotonic sequence  to  is generated where 
. The times, , are the times 
when performance diminishing or enhancing events occur. So: 
 
 (5) 
where 
  
and 
 
 (6) 
 
We break off the development of the resilience measure for 
Class 1 systems here, to resume in Section C because the 
development from  to  is common for both Class 1 
and Class 2 systems. 
B. Class 2 Systems – Context Dependent Performance 
In the same way we begin by developing the figure of merit 
related to resilience for systems for which the required level of 
available performance is contingent on either environmental 
conditions, system operating mode or system condition. The 
same set of  attributes form the basis of system proposal 
evaluation for each case with distinct available performance 
requirements. In each of the cases the weightings of the 
attributes may different, because in the case the need is 
different, and the value-for-scale functions may also be case 
specific. Thus, we generate, , distinct cases, each of which 
has its own set of weighting factors, which become the matrix 
with elements, , for attribute  of the set of , and condition 
case  of the set of . Similarly, the values of available 
performance are determined using the  value-for-scale 
functions: 
 
 (7) 
 
The weights assigned in the trade-space process are  for 
the th attribute. Therefore, the instantaneous achieved figure 
of merit is: 
 
 (8) 
 
The total figure of merit presented in the development of 
Class 1, as equation (4), has no analog in the development of 
Class 2 because the additional concept, the possible transition 
between required available performance levels following from 
the operational modes or environmental conditions is a 
discrete concept. 
The value of  is a discrete function of time, making 
step changes of the available performance depending on threat 
event occurrence which affects the resilience state of the 
system in Fig. 1. In addition, transition between operational 
modes or environmental conditions results in changes of the 
values of  and . The values of  and  change at the 
same time, and system impairments may happen at any time, 
in response to threats which affect the system. 
The duration, , can be divided into  intervals such that a 
monotonic sequence  to  is generated where 
. The times, , are the times 
when performance diminishing or enhancing events, or 
changes in operational mode or environment occur. So: 
 
 (8) 
where 
 and  are the weight and value-for-scale that apply 
during the interval  
 
We break off the separate development of the resilience 
measure for Class 2 systems here and continue in Section C 
because the development from  to  is common for 
both Class 1 and Class 2 systems. 
C. Transforming Figure of Merit to Measure of Resilience 
Equations (6) and (8) describe the lifecycle, or mission 
duration, deterministically, which corresponds to the post hoc 
situation of comparing an achieved lifecycle of a single 
instance of a system. If a system were to operate throughout 
its lifecycle according to design, with no events that impair its 
available performance then the  would be the same as the 
design trade-off analysis valuation of that system. Any system 
impairment, arising from any cause, will lead to an actual 
 less than the ideal. A post hoc calculation of the system 
 is not helpful in the engineering development, or system 
support, because it is only a description of what has been 
achieved. So we seek a method to assist engineering work. 
Resilience concerns the system response to the events 
occurring through the system lifecycle. These events can be 
predicted in kind, effect and probability of occurrence, but 
timing cannot be predicted. The expected  for a system 
through its lifecycle can be determined from the distribution of 
the s for a large plurality of instances of the design 
proposal, using the Monte Carlo method to determine values 
of the , to determine when transitions would happen, and 
then equation (6) or (8) may be used to determine the  for 
the instance of the lifecycle. The values of  can be found by 
using statistical distributions of the time at which resilience 
relevant events may occur. The main driving factors are the 
failure probability of the system elements and the probability 
of occurrence of the external threats to the system and the 
nature of the impairments they cause. Restorative transition 
events occur as a result of maintenance of the system, in 
  
whole or in part, and can be incorporated into the model as 
distributions of the time to effect repair. 
The distribution of the  for a single design proposal 
can be described using descriptive statistics, which can 
provide understanding the probability of various levels of 
impairment of the system implemented according to that 
proposal. A system proposal with desirable resilience 
characteristics would have a mean and median  close to 
the ideal condition, in which design performance capabilities 
are always available. 
In a design choice between alternatives scenario the  
distribution for each alternative is determined and statistical 
tests applied to determine which distribution is better given the 
decision maker’s driving imperatives. Depending on the 
nature of the system, the mean and median values of the 
distribution, the distribution dispersion, and the context 
specific appropriateness of accepting risk a method can be 
used to select the more appropriate design proposal for the 
purpose. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has developed a method for determining the 
resilience  for a system proposal based on the constituent 
elements of the design proposal tradespace process currently 
used for selection of the preferred design alternative. The 
tradespace method is well-established, and many variations of 
that process currently in use could be used in the resilience 
 calculation. Therefore, this approach to determining a 
resilience  allows the continued use of particular 
tradespace methods already in use, and therefore does not 
create conflict with those existing methods and the underlying 
rationale for their application in the particular situations in 
which they are used. The numerical values of attribute weights 
and value-for-scale functions which have been determined 
within a system development project continue to be used in 
the resilience analyses for the same project. 
In a brownfields situation, where action is proposed to 
change an existing system, or to institute action which would 
improve the resilience of a system, attribute weights and 
value-for-scale functions relevant to the proposal will not be 
pre-existing, because anything that exists relates to the original 
system which the proposal is intended to change. New values 
will need to be determined using methods appropriate for the 
proposed system. 
The  presented satisfies the original five driving 
criteria: 
1. Generalizable to any engineered system. Any system for 
which the foundational elements of the tradespace 
analysis have been developed can be analyzed to 
determine the . This can be achieved in any 
greenfield system development project, where the 
development of the tradespace descriptors is part of the 
project, and can be achieved for any brownfield project 
where tradespace analysis is required to determine the 
relative desirability of each proposal. 
2. Agnostic of threat type. The  method presented is 
focused on the achievable performance of the system at 
any time during its lifecycle, which could be affected 
by any and all threat kinds, but the analysis is not 
linked to any assumption about threat types. Specific 
factors associated with threat types enter the analysis 
through their resultant system performance measures. 
Specific threats will cause particular diminutions of 
performance, or disablement of system elements, which 
result in changes to performance. Technical analysis of 
the system and its elements under the influence of those 
threats is a method of determining the effect of events.  
3. Agnostic of outcome, both short and long-term, 
following a threat encounter. The  method accepts 
as a fact of life that engineered systems cannot be made 
indestructible, and that any engineered system is 
subject to impairment, damage and destruction, and 
that the engineering goal is to provide the system which 
best achieves the intended effect through the lifecycle. 
At design time, before the system has been built, the 
best information available to justify decisions is the 
statistical knowledge of the kinds of relevant threats 
and the properties of the elements proposed for use in 
the system. 
4. Cognizant that performance is multidimensional. The 
tradespace technique is inherently a means of resolving 
the relative merit of different proposals which 
addresses the multidimensional character of the 
observable manifestations of system behavior. 
6. Cognizant that threat events occur at any time during the 
lifecycle, with statistical predictability. Impaired 
performance resulting from failure is modelled through 
Monte Carlo analysis enabling comparison of 
alternatives through analysis of the distributions of 
s for the alternatives. 
The  method presented enables comparison of 
competing design proposals for a system to address a 
particular purpose. The comparison is based on distributions 
of the  for a large set of hypothesized lifecycles for each 
design proposal so the selection of the preferred alternative 
can be based on inferential statistical tests from comparing 
distributions, using a means of comparison which suits the 
purpose of the system and the resultant priorities. 
Development of a resilience measurement as described here 
enables comparison of design alternatives in system design or 
system management actions through system life, including 
decision about the effect of performing, or not performing, 
maintenance, or possible system modification. 
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